Thawed out: German - American relations

There was one foreign policy aim at the very top of Angela Merkel's agenda as she moved into the chancellery - to improve the relationship between Germany and the US. The antipathy between George W. Bush and Merkel's predecessor Gerhard Schroeder, arising out of Schroeder's opposition to the Iraq war, had cooled relations considerably.

But the CDU leader quickly developed a strong connection to the Republican Bush, who for his part was liberal with his praise for Merkel. Unlike Schroeder, Merkel could afford to criticize Bush - either for the poor contribution his government made to climate protection, or calling for the closing of the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay.

But the pair did not discuss their differing opinions publicly. Instead, they conferred over a wild boar barbecue in Merkel's constituency, or on Bush's ranch in Texas. The soft sell had its uses - the US president grew accustomed to the fact that Germany would under no circumstances send any troops to southern Afghanistan.

This German-American harmony was briefly ruffled when presidential candidate Barack Obama chose Berlin's Brandenburg Gate as a venue for a campaign speech. The irritated chancellor refused the then Illinois senator his preferred setting, and he eventually made his speech a few hundred meters down the road at the Victory Column, in front of 200,000 enthusiastic spectators. That speech won the hearts of the Germans before he had entered the White House, but he had to work harder to win the heart of their chancellor. The initial reserve between the two did not go unnoticed.

But since then, Merkel and Obama have found a friendly and professional mode of cooperation. Several long talks have fostered mutual esteem. The German government supports Obama's dialog-orientated foreign policy as well as his efforts at disarmament. Obama's visit to Germany in June took him to Dresden and the former concentration camp Buchenwald, liberated by American troops in 1945. There the president found moving words to express the inestimable suffering endured by the prisoners, and cemented trans-Atlantic relations.

Germany and Russia - a problematic partnership

Russia was a difficult partner for the German government. The problem was not that the German chancellor occasionally called on Russia to respect people's rights to freedom of speech or free assembly. It was simply that the trust between the Russian government and its partners in the West became increasingly disturbed. The missile shield in eastern Europe planned by the Bush administration outraged the Russian leadership. At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, President Vladimir Putin brought expression to the frosty atmosphere with some verbal attacks on the West. Not a few observers were reminded of the hostile rhetoric of the Cold War.

The Russian-Georgian war in late summer 2008 strained relations even further. The EU mediated, creating an agreement around a six-point peace plan that Russia promptly broke. When Russia recognized the independence of the two Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Merkel protested that Russia's position was a violation of international law. Talks at the summit between NATO and Russia were temporarily suspended.

The next crisis came with the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine at the beginning of 2009. For the first time, Russia cut off Europe's gas supply for a sustained period of time, and was then offended when the German government declared both sides responsible for the escalation of the crisis. Now Germany is hoping to secure independence from Russia's gas supply by relying on the new Nabucco pipeline to pump gas from central Asia to central Europe.

But even though there are enough reasons for Germany and Russia to maintain a critical distance, in recent months both governments have been engaged in a more pragmatic, sometimes even friendly cooperation – particularly in dealing with the financial crisis, which has hit Russia as hard as Europe.

Afghanistan - a never-ending horror?

Stay the course - this is the German army's motto for its mission in Afghanistan. There is no prospect of withdrawal for the approximately 4,000 German NATO soldiers in the ISAF alliance. Indeed, since the deployment in northern Afghanistan has become more dangerous, the grand coalition has redoubled its efforts: more soldiers, more hardware, more training for Afghan security forces.

Despite many small improvements, the country is nowhere near stability, and questions are being asked that the German government does not like to answer in public. Questions like: how many soldiers have to die in the Hindu kush region for the situation to become untenable? Or, could the mission begun after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 actually fail altogether? Several surveys have shown that a majority of Germans are against the Afghan deployment - which is becoming a good reason for the government to keep the issue out of the current election campaign. When critical observations are made in public, the reaction usually consists of a routine recitation involving the phrase "the concept of a security network," meaning the cooperation of a robust military presence and civilian support. This is still believed to be the key to success.

One idea has united the grand coalition for the last four years: that a premature withdrawal would destroy all the work done so far, especially since Obama's US government has increased military pressure on the Taliban and its allies. The line held by former defence minister Peter Struck is still adhered to today: Germany is also defended in Hindu kush. The German government is prepared to spend a lot of money on this belief. In 2008 alone, the Afghanistan mission cost Germany $760 million (530 million euros).

The Middle East: peace remains a fantasy

Frank-Walter Steinmeier has not visited any region in the world more often than the Middle East. The foreign minister has now travelled there 14 times. Countless personal discussions have made him extremely well-informed of the conflict between Israelis, Palestinians and the neighboring countries. He was truly gratified when he could report a glimmer of hope or a moment of rapprochement, however small, and he managed to add his personal diplomatic stamp when, in spite of American protests, he insisted on going to Damascus to bring Syria into negotiations.

But the windows of opportunity in the Middle Eastern peace process, which the grand coalition of Christian Democrat and Social Democrats hoped to take advantage of, shut all too quickly. The war between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbollah in summer 2006 and the Israeli army's attack on the Gaza Strip in winter 2009 destroyed any faith in the international "road map" to peace. And in both wars, the German government unambiguously took Israel's side. Chancellor Merkel put the blame for the hundreds of civilian casualties in the Gaza war squarely at the feet of Hamas and demonstratively visited then Israeli leader Ehud Olmert immediately after the war ended. This one-sided positioning forfeited what trust the German government had amongst the Palestinian public.

Author: Nina Werkhaeuser/bk
Editor: Deanne Corbett