The Israel Defense Forces' (IDF) report into the October 7 Hamas terror attacks in southern Israel made for difficult reading for most Israelis. The conclusions in the report, released last week, were not entirely new, but they added another layer after an emotional few weeks in which over 30 hostages were returned alive but eight more came home in coffins.

And while the first phase of the ceasefire and hostage release deal has come to an end, the next phase remains unclear. Fifty-nine kidnapped soldiers and civilian hostages remain in Gaza, 24 of whom are believed to be alive.

After the publication of the report, Israel's mainstream daily Yedioth Ahronoth ran the headline "The blindness, the failure, the questions." The headline in Israel Hayom, a right-wing free daily, was "A debacle, years in the making," referring to one of the report's key findings: That Israel's intelligence community vastly underestimated Hamas for many years.

In 2007, after winning elections, the militant group and Palestinian national movement assumed control of Gaza from the Fatah-ruled Palestinian Authority. In response, Israel further tightened its control over the air, land and sea borders, controlling the movement of people and goods in and out of the enclave. Both Israel and Hamas have fought several wars in recent years.

IDF's failure 'left deep scars'

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-led militants launched a large-scale attack in southern Israel, killing 1,200 people and taking another 251 hostage, according to Israeli figures. The attack sparked a 15-month war in which more than 48,000 Palestinians have been killed, according to Gaza's Health Ministry, and much of the small territory was razed to the ground.

For some, the latest comprehensive report about the work of the different branches of the military comes too late; for others, there is little new to report. For many Israeli's, the IDF's failure to protect its citizens has left deep scars. In recent months, the military has provided residents of several kibbutzim near Gaza with minute-by-minute reports of events in their communities.

"The importance of the report is first and foremost for the survivors, the families of soldiers and civilians who were killed, the families of those who were kidnapped and the [southern] communities, those who have still not returned," said Ofer Shelah, researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and a former Knesset member.

"I think this was important to reestablish trust between those communities, the Israeli public in general, and the army, that the army faces the survivors, and they tell them what happened, and be frank about it," Shelah told DW. 

He added, however, that many questions remain as to why things happened the way they did within the military and its various branches, and in relation to the political echelons. This was echoed by Tamir Hayman, director at the INSS and former head of the Military Intelligence Directorate.

"In every military inquiry, three questions need to be answered: what happened, why it happened, and how to improve," Hayman told a panel at Channel 12's Meet the Press on Saturday. "These inquiries give us a lot of information about what happened, but there is still one question — why it happened — that I have not found answers to."

Misconceptions about Hamas

The inquiry concluded that the assessment of Hamas over many years had not been challenged and that there had been no discussion of the question "what if we're wrong?"

According to Amos Harel, writing in the daily Ha'aretz, "The intelligence community, with the IDF and the Shin Bet security service in the forefront, didn't believe that Hamas was capable of mounting a coordinated attack of thousands of terrorists at more than 100 crossing points, who would successfully overcome the Gaza Division and take control of a large part of the territory for which the division was responsible."

The inquiry also criticized the fact that intelligence and political leaders opted for a policy of "conflict management" towards Hamas and an incorrect assessment of its capabilities and intentions.

"Gaza was presented as a 'secondary threat' compared to Hezbollah and Iran," wrote Yossi Yeshuoshua, military affairs correspondent for Yedioth Ahronoth. "The entire Israeli leadership — from the government to the intelligence branches — became addicted to intelligence produced by advanced and sophisticated technology, creating complacency and arrogance among those who are supposed to be constantly looking over their shoulders. We shouted 'cyber' and fell asleep at the wheel, while Hamas was preparing a medieval-style invasion."

An attack long in the making

The report found that, based on documents found in Gaza and interrogations of senior Hamas militants captured during the war, the group began discussing a large-scale attack after the 2014 war in Gaza.

The plan, which later became known as "Jericho Wall," was developed primarily by the late Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, considered one of the leading planners of October 7, after he became head of Hamas in Gaza in 2017. It involved a surprise attack on the IDF's Gaza Division stationed around the Gaza Strip and the taking of hostages. According to the investigation, Hamas considered carrying out the attack plan as early as May 2021, when Israel and Hamas fought an 11-day war in Gaza. At the time, Israeli military intelligence was unaware of the plan, the report stated.

The report shows that the May 2021 war, also known in Israel as "Operation Guardian of the Walls," was a turning point. The IDF publicly concluded at the time that Hamas had been dealt a severe blow, with large parts of its tunnels — dubbed the "metro" by the army — destroyed, and that the underground barrier Israel had built had reduced infiltration to a minimum. Israeli leaders appeared to believe that Hamas wanted to focus on economic development and maintain calm above all.

But the report said that, in fact, Hamas felt encouraged by the outcome of the 2021 war because it had managed to gain support in the region without the IDF launching a major ground operation.

The report also renewed calls for a state commission of inquiry to investigate the role of Israel's political leadership. "The Israeli public can't ensure that politicians pay a price, and that's why they want a commission of inquiry," said Ofer Shelah.

An opinion poll published on Friday asked respondents whether the military investigation was enough, or whether there should be a state or political commission of inquiry. Only 6% said they thought the military inquiry was enough, while 58% said they'd like to see a state commission of inquiry. 

While IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi has resigned over the failures of October 7 and will leave his post on Wednesday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not accepted responsibility and has repeatedly put off a full investigation until after the war.

Edited by: Ben Knight