Prof. Federiga Bindi is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-John Hopkins in Washington DC and a tenured professor and Jean Monnet Chair in European Integration at the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she is also founding director of the Jean Monnet European Center for Excellence.

The Arab spring was predicted by many experts in the field: the changes in the economy, the rise in the level of education of the younger generations coupled with the inability to successfully join the labor market, and their ability to connect thanks to new technologies were all indicators that things were about to change.

Should these revolutions lead to new democratic systems, political scientists will label them as the fifth wave of democratization, the previous four being those after World War II (Italy), the 1970s (Greece, Spain and Portugal), 1980s (Latin America) and after 1989 (Eastern Europe).

However, the situation is different in Southern Europe. To begin with, the region is still in the midst of the financial crisis but in ways that are very different from what happened for instance in the US, where it happened almost overnight, leaving people helpless in a system that offers no safety nets in terms of both social and family protection. The feeling of being exposed was therefore acute: one poignant symbol is the sight of so many foreclosure signs that one can find all over the US.

The crisis in Southern Europe was slower to arrive and was mitigated by the protection offered by existing savings, by the existence of strong family bonds, by a less-exposed banking system and by the existence of social correctors. A number of measures where also immediately taken, for instance the possibility created by the Italian government for people to renegotiate their mortgages without penalties or added expenses. This saved the Italian housing market, whose prices in fact stabilized and did not fall like they did in the US.

Controlling the crisis

Consumption is also different. In the US, economic savings and consumption are based on the individual lifecycle and on borrowing. Those who can, pay for their children's education, but otherwise consume everything they earn within their lifecycle, leaving little or nothing to their children. In Southern Europe, the old saying is that - with the exception of buying a house and eventually a car - things shall only be purchased if one has sufficient cash.

Of course, this is becoming less and less the case, but it is still a widespread cultural attitude and the tendency to save is still at the basis of spending behavior. This approach to life savings has mitigated the effects of the economic crisis, offering safety nets both in concrete and psychological terms.

Secondly, Southern European countries are already democratic, very much including Silvio Berlusconi's Italy. The fact that (some) people do not like him as a political leader, and the fact that his personal behavior would have led to his resignation in many other countries, does not mean that the country as such is not democratic.

In fact, Italy has been a fully-fledged democracy only since the early 1990s. In other words, while in the years of the "First Republic" (1946-1993), Italy was formally a democratic system because it fulfilled the minimum criteria for being a democracy (free competitive and recurrent elections; more than one party; free media; universal voting rights), it is only since 1994 - with the onset of the "Second Republic" - that the country has enjoyed a true multi-party system.

Before that date, in fact, the communist party (PCI) was excluded from the national executive (though not from the presidency of the Parliament, nor from governing at both the local and regional levels), as was the post-fascist party (MSI), that was excluded from government at basically all levels. While the exclusion of the latter found its origins in the legacy of the post-fascist regime, the exclusion of the PCI from government was dictated by the US to Italy after World War II, at the time of Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi's trip to Washington.

Refusing to budge

The problem is that many of the actors belonging to the First Republic are still around and are still finding it extremely hard to adapt to a multi-party system. This applies to former Christian Democrats, Socialist, Liberals and Republicans: they were so used to being in power that they cannot adapt to politics without it. But it also applies to the former communists, who had their share of benefits in the past political system.

The question many are asking is how is it possible that these people are still around? For Italy to finish its "Spring" - initiated in the early 1990s - there has to be a wholesale clear-out. Silvio Berlusconi's departure would not solve Italy's deeper problems and would probably have two negative consequences.

First the return to a fully-fledged system of consociationalism such as existed in the First Republic (essentially a national unity government), would lead again to a political system with no real alternatives.

Secondly, it would deprive the Democratic Party of its main political goal (to fight the "enemy") and this vacuum would in turn open the way to extremist and protest parties of all kinds, which are already registering an exponential raise - as the recent local elections showed. A gloomy situation, indeed.

It seems, unfortunately, that the theses of Giuseppe Di Palma, Joe La Palombara, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (leading political scientists - the ed.) about Italy still seem to hold true, according to which the country is characterized as a political patronage culture, with a limited spread and acceptance of the idea that civic duty plays a part in politics. There is also little interest in and poor information about politics and a widespread sense of impotence on the part of individuals to influence national and local political decision-making.

This attitude pervades the political and administrative systems and is also fueled by the media, whose style is very different from the investigative journalism practiced by their English-speaking counterparts. When political scientist Leonardo Morlino compares the Italian and the Spanish cases, for instance, he finds that the democratic regime in Spain has succeeded in becoming comparatively more consolidated than the one in Italy.

Indeed, Spain, Portugal and Greece are different cases: as their totalitarian regimes only ended some 30 years ago, the memory is still widespread of how - despite current economic difficulties - they are so much better off today: politically, economically and socially. Countries such as Spain or Portugal have experienced an incredible leap forward in terms of modernization, economic growth, quality of life, changes in the political class.

While 20 years ago they were still grappling with unpaved roads in the heart of their capitals, widespread poorness and low levels of education, they are now active and modern countries with a say in European and world affairs. There is, therefore, no temptation to risk a change backwards.

Generation change

So, all is well? Of course not. The younger generations - a definition that in Southern Europe stretches to those in their early 40s - are facing problems. With few exceptions, their prospects are limited, their salaries are low and do not allow for savings - thus marking a serious break with the past that generates uncertainty both among them and their parents.

Some leave, some dream to come back but do not. While in the US, education makes the difference both in terms of salary and career, in Southern Europe there is generally nothing of the kind. This is especially the case in Italy, where gerontocracy reigns. Yet, there are exceptions, and there are signs here and there that the younger generations have had enough. Associations, groups - both physical and virtual - are being formed. Debates spread on social media and people are meeting to discuss how can they contribute to change.

Those who have managed to progress in their careers and now enjoy comfortable professional positions are starting to get organized to help the country change. It is a widespread movement that is still going unnoticed by most of the Italian media and that - just like in the Arab countries - finds its main source of circulation through social media oulets. A few people have already successfully defied the political system, symbolized by the young major of Florence, Matteo Renzi, (a fierce Berlusconi critic, who is calling for a widespread generational change in Italian politics - the ed.).

And - just like in the Mediterranean area - there are thousands of young people who have a lot of free time on their hands due to unemployment and who - when the time comes - will be ready to join to the club to bring change to the existing system.

The climate is just like it was in the early 1990s. The Italian politicians of the times - left and right alike - had no clue that the system was about to collapse: they were caught by surprise and thrown out. They could soon be again.

Editor: Rob Mudge