During my decade in Washington, one of the catch phrases used by both Democrats and Republicans alike was to characterize people and institutions as fitting into one of two separate and mutually exclusive categories: either they were organ grinders or monkeys. That is either an organization was running the show, or it was merely serving the bidding of some more powerful, unseen master.

Brussels has long been in desperate need of such a classification system. Almost all the analytical troubles that emanate from the European project writ large come from this failure to see who is really in charge, as if the alphabet soup of institutions comprising the EU were somehow intrinsically all equal, of if the states that underwrote the whole project had suddenly ceased to really matter. Such a fallacy makes its adherents appear ridiculous, being proven wrong again and again, just as it poses analytical challenges for the rest of us, ever in search of the elusive organ grinder of Europe.

Who's in charge?

Yet crises at their best clarify. Just as the euro crisis has made it clear that beneath the curtain it is Germany that is calling the shots (not Europe) regarding the whole economic project, so the Libyan adventure has made it embarrassingly obvious that Europe (and the European Security and Defense Policy, ESDP, in particular) will never amount to more than monkey status on the world stage. This is true no matter how many Brussels-sponsored conferences of true believers are held to convince/brainwash the rest of us that, all appearances to the contrary, real progress is being made, and that the Valhalla of a genuine common European defense policy is just around the corner.

For Libya has made it crystal clear that, as every realist in the world knows, over the most basic issues of war and peace, states still (and probably always will) call the shots.

Given this vexing reality, the saner cheerleaders for Europe grudgingly agreed, but said the future post-Iraq war Europe would be entirely different. Whereas in that case the UK went along with Bush administration follies (while being opposed by France and Germany), in the future the Big 3, (the absolute minimum political combination necessary for a European-wide defense strategy to function), would generally stand together on defense issues as disparate as favoring humanitarian interventions to opposing American militarist impulses. What no one saw coming was a Nobel Peace prize winning laureate President harnessing American martial fervor, but this time to the cause of humanitarian interventions.

Germany as Liechtenstein

Into this unthought-of scenario, the usual perpetual divisions persist. Germany, wishing it were Liechtenstein rather than the most powerful country in Europe, ran a mile from the risky Libyan operation. France, its Gaullist impulses unleashed by the humanitarian nature of the mission (and with President Sarkozy on life support in the polls) eagerly took the lead. Britain, chastened by Iraq but with Prime Minister Cameron having discovered his inner Blair when the cause was so disinterested, followed Paris and Washington's lead.

But the end result was the same, a divided Europe, with ESDP firmly on the sidelines as the French and Americans (with London's support) bickered over whether NATO or a coalition of the willing should take the lead. Notice Europe as such was the ugly stepsister in such a debate, not being noticed very much.

It is time for some home truths. States, and not international organizations like the European Union, ultimately always have and always will decide high-end defense matters. European divisions over the Iraq war are not an anomaly, rather they are the empirical norm. And until the Big three truly coordinate their foreign policies (no one hold their breath) or happen by luck to have common interests in a specific case, ESDP will remain what it has always been….a monkey.

John C. Hulsman is president and co-founder of John C. Hulsman Enterprises, a political-risk firm that advises governmental and large corporate clients. A life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, Hulsman is also senior research fellow at The Hague Center For Strategic Studies (www.hcss.nl).

Editor: Michael Knigge/Rob Mudge