Rakhine state in western Myanmar plays a key role in determining the outcome of the civil war that has been raging in the Southeast Asian nation since its military seized power in a coup in February 2021.  

That's because the Arakan Army (AA), an ethnic armed group originating in Rakhine, has posed one of the biggest military challenges for the ruling junta. 

The AA has managed to seize control of almost the entire state and is also active in other parts of Myanmar. However, its advance has slowed down recently.

Meanwhile, the region is also experiencing a humanitarian catastrophe, which is receiving little global attention. Reports on Rakhine are as sketchy as those on the ongoing civil war in Sudan.

"Rakhine stands on the precipice of an unprecedented disaster," the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) already warned last year.

The situation in Rakhine has also had a significant impact on the fate of the Rohingya, a mainly Muslim ethnic minority in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar.

According to the World Health Organization, around 650,000 Rohingya fled from Myanmar to neighboring Bangladesh due to ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar military, particularly in the years 2016 and 2017.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) says there are still some 630,000 Rohingya people living in Rakhine, most of them in northern border areas or in camps around the capital Sittwe.

Border blockades in a multi-front war

The situation in Rakhine is precarious for not just Rohingya but all residents. The state has always been one of Myanmar's most disadvantaged regions, plagued by poverty, poor infrastructure, and internal tensions.

After the military coup in 2021, a ceasefire between the junta and the AA remained in place. But since fighting resumed in 2023, Rakhine has become one of the main battlegrounds in the civil war.

The parties to the conflict have become embroiled in an ongoing multi-front conflict.

In the region's south and east, as well as around the areas still held by the junta, the AA has been fighting against the military government.

Most recently, it suffered heavy losses in its unsuccessful attempt to capture the deep-sea port in Kyaukphyu.

In the north, where the military was defeated at the end of 2024, fighting between AA and armed Rohingya militias flares up regularly.

Isolation deepens amid escalating conflict

Rakhine is currently largely cut off from the outside world.

The Myanmar military is blocking all routes connecting the state to the country's heartland and regularly bombs targets in Rakhine, also killing many civilians.

The route to India is currently blocked because the government in New Delhi has closed the border due to a cholera epidemic. Bangladesh also closed its border in July.

And Rohingya militias are operating in the Bangladesh-Myanmar border area, where they are fighting the AA.

People in the isolated, conflict-ridden region, meanwhile, are struggling to survive.  

In November, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) counted around 460,000 internally displaced persons.

The United League of Arakan (ULA), the political arm of the Arakanese resistance, told DW that the actual figure is about 600,000.

The numbers cannot be independently verified.

If accurate, this would mean that about 20% of the region's 3.6 million people have been forced to flee their homes.

Meanwhile, rice production in Rakhine — which was originally also exported to other parts of Myanmar and even Bangladesh — has collapsed.

Prices for rice and cooking oil have experienced wild swings and increased tenfold at times since 2023, according to the UNDP.

"The key challenges for people's survival remain access to basic commodities, medicines and secondary products such as cooking oil, fuel and gas," the ULA told DW in a statement. 

War crimes often difficult to attribute

All sides — the military junta, the AA, and Rohingya militias — accuse each other of human rights violations, massacres, war crimes, and terrorism.

On December 10, on International Human Rights Day, the military bombed a hospital in Mrauk-U, killing at least 30 people.

In other cases, however, it is often difficult to reconstruct exactly what happened and who is responsible.

The burning down of villages, for instance, is well documented with the help of satellite images, but it is often impossible to determine beyond doubt who started the fires and when.

Social media also often spreads alleged and actual atrocities indiscriminately, making it very difficult to get a realistic picture of the situation.

And much remains unclear on the ground. The junta is, in a sense, an external enemy in Rakhine, and the lines between it and the AA are relatively clear.

The conflict between the Rohingya militias and the AA, on the other hand, is primarily an internal one with no clear lines.

Breeding ground for unrestrained violence

"The question is always when civilians are affected and in what form," said Christin Pschichholz, historian and research associate at the German Police University (DHPol) who has long researched military history and the cultural history of violence.

"In civil wars, where fighting often takes place in areas where many people live and where combatants can mingle with the population, the boundaries between combatants and non-combatants become blurred," he told DW, speaking about the factors that encourage war crimes and unrestrained violence.

This is exacerbated by situational factors such as poor supplies, bad weather, and unclear terrain.

A pronounced threat perception and asymmetries can also contribute to the brutalization of a conflict.

"When combatants feel they are fighting for their very survival, it becomes easier to justify crossing boundaries," emphasized Pschichholz.

Ideological, religious, and political factors are particularly influential, the expert stressed.

"How is the opponent being perceived? Has dehumanization taken place?" In such cases, the image of the enemy often expands, he said. "The threat is seen not only in the armed opponents, but in the entire group, which becomes the enemy as a whole."

When listing the factors, it becomes clear that all of them are present in Rakhine state. It is a civil war in which the battle lines are often unclear. There is a shortage of supplies and a pervasive sense of threat, especially among the Rohingya.

There are several asymmetries. The junta is militarily superior to the AA, as it has an air force and navy, for example, and is supplied with weapons and ammunition by China, Russia, and Belarus. The AA, in turn, is superior to the Rohingya militias. There are longstanding ethno-nationalist and religious tensions.

Organizing daily life

Against this difficult backdrop, the ULA is attempting to provide for the population, reduce tensions, and — as far as possible in a war zone — organize daily life.

This often fails because the Rakhine and Rohingya ethnic groups distrust each other and often assume the worst.

After taking control of northern Rakhine, for instance, the ULA decided to reopen schools. It called on Rohingya teachers to return to classes.

However, as the ULA was unable to pay the teachers due to a lack of financial resources, it suggested that the teachers collect the money from the students' parents.

This prompted resistance from the Rohingya teachers, who felt that the Arakanese were forcing them to exploit their own people, already suffering from severe deprivation. The Rohingya teachers accused them of forced recruitment.

The Arakanese, in turn, perceived this as an affront and a rejection, because teachers from other ethnic groups were also not paid.

Both interpretations are plausible, though not necessarily true. Another possible interpretation of events is that the Rohingya are in such dire straits that they are unable to participate in reconstruction without support.

It could also be viewed as the ULA being genuinely interested in improving relations with the Rohingya and involving them in the reconstruction process. This also makes strategic sense, as the AA knows that its chances of keeping Rakhine state in the fight against the Myanmar military will increase if it succeeds in reducing internal tensions.

Escaping the vicious circle

This generous interpretation does not mean justifying the crimes committed by the AA and the Rohingya militias. It is important to differentiate, as this is a prerequisite for resolving the internal conflict in Rakhine.

Pschichholz believes the only way to escape the vicious circle is to have patience and succeed in creating empathy and trust. To do this, it is necessary to see and acknowledge the suffering of the other side, he said. "But many people will have traumatic experiences that make it almost impossible for them to empathize with the traumatic experiences of others."

In this precarious situation, every act of violence and every rumor can undermine attempts at rapprochement and contribute to prolonging the war, which is being fought not only on the battlefield but also in people's minds.

This article was originally published in German