The US-Israel war with Iran that broke out February 28 did not start in a vacuum. The conflict between the US and Iran has developed over generations. DW takes a look at how three key events — the 1953 coup, the 1979-81 hostage crisis, and the ongoing nuclear dispute — continue not just to shape policy and public opinion, but also paved the way for war.  

The CIA and the coup 

For much of the 20th century, Iran and the United States had a close relationship. After World War II, Washington saw Tehran as a key ally against the Soviet Union. The US supported the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who positioned Iran as a pro‑Western monarchy in the Middle East.   

But in 1951, Iran's elected prime minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, nationalized Iran's oil industry, challenging Western control of Iranian resources. Two years later, the CIA and Britain's MI6 helped organize a coup against Mossadegh. Ian Lesser, vice president at the German Marshall Fund think tank, notes that the 1953 coup was a turning point, "which the United States and Britain essentially engineered to overthrow Mossadegh and to reinstall the shah." 

The coup restored the shah's authority, but it also created a deep sense of injustice in Iranian society. Many Iranians saw it as foreign intervention against democracy. Negin Shiraghei, founder of the Azadi Network focused on promoting the"Woman, Life, Freedom" movement in Iran, explains: "My parents' generation thought the problems the country had were because of the US intervention. They saw the shah as a puppet of the US." This sentiment became a driving force of the Islamic Revolution three decades later. 

The revolution and the hostage crisis 

By the end of the 1970s, dissatisfaction with the shah's regime had been growing steadily. Many in this generation saw the shah's rule as repressive and believed Washington had played a decisive role in sustaining it.  

In 1979, mass protests ended the shah's rule. Religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned from exile and created the Islamic Republic, adopting an anti‑Western and anti‑American ideology.  

Today, many members of the generation that helped establish the Islamic Republic and its confrontational policy toward the United States still hold senior positions in Iran. And the current Iranian leadership still relies heavily on the symbols and slogans of the 1979 revolution to justify its power. A key pillar of this system is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and political force created to defend the revolution and suppress internal dissent, routinely cracking down on protests, media and civil society. 

In the United States, a different memory dominates: the 1979-81 hostage crisis. On November 4, 1979, a student group aligned with Khomeni's political ideology stormed the US Embassy in Tehran and took 66 American hostages. They demanded that the US hand over the shah, who had left Iran for exile, and said they wanted to prevent another foreign‑backed coup like the one in 1953.  

For many Americans, the embassy takeover was an attack on their country and a humiliation broadcast on television. The hostages were held for 444 days and their release was broadcast and then was followed by a heroes' welcome and parade in New York, leaving an impact that still shapes public opinion and policymaking today.  

According to Lesser, many in positions of power today in Washington, indeed "the people around the US president and the president himself," formed their views in this period. "That perception about Iran as an adversary is very much embedded in certain generations," he said. 

The hostility further grew with the 1983 Beirut barracks bombings, in which the Iran-backed Hezbollah militia killed more than 200 US marines in Lebanon. Lesser said US perceptions about Iran "were molded by these experiences. The key terrorist attacks that Iran was behind are very much front of mind." 

Nuclear fears and failed diplomacy 

After the 1979 revolution, anti‑American feeling in Iran was strong. But Shiraghei says this intensity faded faster than Iranian government propaganda would want the public to believe: "The sentiment on the ground was changing rapidly, even if people didn't have the courage to say it."  

Iranians who came of age in the 1990s and early 2000s experienced a period marked by attempts at political opening. They supported reformist leaders and, for a time, believed change might be possible. Shiraghei says her generation grew up aware of US power but questioned propaganda slogans such as America being the "Great Satan" or calling for "Death to America." "My generation was aware of the negative aspects of American power, how they're going around the world and creating wars," she said. "But at the same time, we were thinking, is that amount of hostility necessary?"  

On a political level, cooperation between Washington and Tehran did occur, most notably after the September 11, 2001attacks. As Lesser points out, "we were on the same page when it came to Sunni fundamentalism and al-Qaida. We could maybe even be on the same page on energy security, since both countries are vested in the supply security of exports." These shared interests, however, rarely survived shifts in political leadership.   

In Iran, the reform movement faced resistance from hardliners, and hopes for change faded. And in the US, fear of Iran developing a nuclear weapon became a dominant concern in the early 2000s. Washington suspected Iran of trying to build a bomb, while Tehran insisted its program was for civilian energy. These suspicions led to years of sanctions, pressure and threats, creating a cycle of escalation that shaped politics on both sides.

Attempts at diplomacy produced the 2015 nuclear deal, which limited Iran's enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. But critics in the US argued the deal was too narrow and temporary. When the Trump administration withdrew from it in 2018, mistrust deepened again. 

After the deal collapsed, negotiations repeatedly stalled. Iran expanded its nuclear efforts, and the US increased sanctions. In June 2025, the US started bombing Iranian nuclear facilities. Then joint US and Israeli airstrikes, which killed Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, marked the start of the 2026 war.

Lesser believes rapprochement between the two sides still remains possible, arguing that "generational change will work in a positive direction. Large parts of Iranian society, especially young people, just aren't willing to support this regime anymore."

Shiraghei notes that "the American dream was exported through movies and the internet," shaping the views of younger Iranians despite state restrictions. She says that even during war, anti‑American sentiment among young people remained limited because "they're not going to look outside to find an enemy. They have the enemy next to them inside."

The interviews for this article were conducted by Ralph Martin