Only a few years ago, a provocative statement by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban had the potential to cause a stir across Europe — such as when he announced his concept of an "illiberal democracy." There were fears that his right-wing and nationalist authoritarianism could set a precedent and further undermine the European Union.

By now, hardly anyone in the EU takes Orban seriously. His only relevance in matters of foreign policy is essentially his veto power, which he often uses in destructive ways in Brussels. The European People's Party, a center-right bloc in the European Parliament, practically forced out Orban's political party, Fidesz, in 2021. Since then, the Hungarian prime minister and his ruling party have unsuccessfully looked for a new home within EU politics. With Orban's East-West lurch — and his stance friendly to Russian President Vladimir Putin stance — the strongman has found himself isolated.

Since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, this stance has strained Orban's ties with allies such as Poland and Slovenia. So much so that a Budapest Visegrad summit, scheduled for this week, was scrapped because neither Poland, the Czech Republic, nor Slovakia felt like attending.

"Führer Democracy"

At home, however, Orban reigns supreme. More than a decade in power, the prime minister has a firm grip on the state apparatus, civil service, much of the judiciary, media and even parts of the economy. He has the last say on many matters. It is for this reason Hungarian-Austrian journalist Paul Lendvai labelled Hungary a "Führer Democracy."

This Sunday, Hungarians will get to vote on whether to keep or dismiss Orban's system. For the first time since 2010, Orban could realistically lose the election. A certain Orban fatigue now pervades the country, and many are tired of the clientelism and corruption plaguing the nation. Also, for the first time in a decade, Hungary's opposition has overcome its differences and will contest the election as one. Their odds are not bad.

Free but unfair elections

The outcome will carry great significance not only for Hungary but the entire EU. Orban, after all, was the first leader of an EU member state to systematically roll back democracy and the rule of law at home, sparking years of tiresome debate and crises in the bloc.

Several other member states temporarily emulated elements of his model, chiefly in central and southeastern Europe. Orban's electoral victory or defeat this Sunday will therefore say a lot about whether his illiberal brand of democracy has a future in the EU.

Last week's polls show that Orban's Fidesz party and the country's six united opposition parties are head-to-head. These numbers belie how uneven the playing field really is between both camps. Critics have said for years that while elections are free in Hungary, they are anything but fair.

Rule fiddling

Orban regularly initiates nationwide opinion polls, so-called "national consultations," regarding various political and societal questions. Critics say that these state-funded quasi-surveys in reality constitute pro-government campaigns that variously stoke fear of refugees, US billionaire George Soros, supposedly work-shy Roma people or homosexuals.

Moreover, authorities have continuously tweaked Hungarian electoral law to put Fidesz and its voters at an advantage. The Orban government reorganized electoral districts in order to benefit at the ballot box. Hungarian ethnic minorities in neighboring countries, who tend to hold Hungarian citizenship and sympathize with Fidesz, may cast their vote by mail.

Hungarian immigrants in western Europe, by contrast, rarely support the party and are not entitled to postal voting. Instead, they must cast their vote at embassies or consulates, which leads to a lower turnout.

The gloves are off

In late 2021, Orban also allowed voter registration at addresses where voters don't actually live, presumably to encourage voter tourism. This is one reason why OSCE election monitors will scrutinize the vote. Their job is to document potential cases of electoral fraud.

Peter Marki-Zay, an eloquent provincial mayor who leads the opposition camp, has dismissed the Orban government as "the most corrupt in the past thousand years in Hungary." He has accused Orban of hypocrisy in railing against poor migrants, yet simultaneously providing a safe haven to dubiously wealthy businessmen from around the world. Orban and his party countered by framing Marki-Zay as a political puppet controlled by despised social-liberal ex-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany.

A risky strategy

Hungarian election campaigns have a decades-long tradition of mud-slinging. This year, however, the Ukraine war overshadowed much of the run-up to Sunday's vote. It is unclear how Orban's pro-Putin stance will affect his chances. Many Hungarians are deeply shocked by Russia's war on Ukraine. Even Fidesz supporters can't help feel reminded of 1956, when Soviet troops brutally suppressed the Hungarian revolution.

Thus far, Hungary's government has issued only a half-hearted condemnation of the war, with pro-government media outlets spreading outlandish pro-Russian propaganda. Orban himself has avoided openly criticizing Putin, arguing that Hungary should stay out of the conflict. This is a risky election strategy, given that Orban in his younger years made a name for himself with anti-Soviet slogans and until 2010 voiced criticism of Putin.

Orban loyalists in powerful positions

Orban accuses the opposition of wanting to send soldiers to fight in Ukraine — an entirely fabricated claim. Opposition figures, in turn, have cast the upcoming vote as a moment to side with either Putin or the West, tyranny or democratic Europe.

Whatever the outcome, one thing is already clear today: even if Orban loses, he will continue to pull strings from behind the scenes. Many high-ranking positions in the state apparatus, media council, constitutional court, and business fora are held by Orban loyalists. Some will remain in office for years. With their help, Orban will be able to sabotage the work of any new government.

This article has been translated from German.

Edited by: Andreas Illmer