When Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel ended her political career three years ago, I was supposed to interview her counterpart, Russia's President Vladimir Putin, in Moscow, for a documentary. Other heads of state and government who had worked with Merkel during her time in office were also to feature in the program, a retrospective of the German leader and her career.

But the Kremlin said no. The reason it gave was that all the other interview partners were former leaders, whereas the Russian president was still in office. The project was therefore deemed unworthy of him. I was, at least, allowed to interview Dmitry Medvedev, the former Russian president who served a single term from 2008 to 2012, as a sort of interim head of state. Putin couldn't run for president again in 2008 for constitutional reasons; instead, he became prime minister, and continued to pull the strings of government in the background.

Medvedev was never actually Russia's number one. For the past twenty-five years, that has always been Vladimir Putin, ever since he was appointed Russian prime minister by then-president Boris Yeltsin on August 9, 1999. Western politicians, including Germany's long-term chancellor Merkel, come and go, but Putin remains.

In the course of these twenty-five years, the Russian president has transformed his country into the "strongest personalized dictatorship in the world," says the Russian political scientist Mikhail Komin.

He told DW that this was only possible because, over the quarter-century he has been in power, Putin has persistently undermined all of Russia's political institutions.

Regional control as the foundation of power

It all began with the abolition of regional autonomy, Komin explains. The Kremlin created its own instrument of control in the Russian regions, laying the foundation for a consolidation of power.

Another Russian political scientist, Grigory Nishnikov, based in Finland, shares this view. "If we think back to the Russia of the early Putin years, we can point to several autonomous centers of power, both constitutional and informal, such as the oligarchs," he told DW. "They all formed a sort of counterweight to the Kremlin." As Nishnikov explains, Putin destroyed all this, centralized everything, and focused Russia's system of power on himself.

However, he believes that this is not the only reason why the Russian president has remained in power for so long. There have been plenty of events over the past twenty-five years that could have been dangerous for Putin, namely:

•           the protests in Moscow's Bolotnaya Square following the 2011 parliamentary election,

•           the risk of instability in Crimea after the Ukrainian peninsula was annexed in 2014,

•           the unrest that followed the controversial pension reform in 2018,

•           massive protests in support of the late Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny across Russia over the next few years,

•           the start of the war in Ukraine, accompanied by protests on the streets of Moscow and St Petersburg.

However, every act of popular resistance was followed by even greater repression: "And new adversaries were always eliminated in the course of these events," Nishnikov says. As a result, he does not believe there is anyone left now who could challenge Putin.

Weakening of the judiciary is another key factor

Mikhail Komin notes that another important factor that has enabled Putin to cling to power was the deliberate weakening of the courts that occurred during his second term. Chief justices loyal to the authorities were given greater powers over their subordinate colleagues.

As a result, Komin says, the Russian courts are no longer independent. They can at best slow down the processes of state repression directed against citizens, but they can no longer put a stop to it.

This has been compounded by changes to the electoral system in favour of Vladimir Putin and his ruling party, United Russia.

Putin's 'shadow cabinet'

Instead of asserting himself against a democratic opposition, Putin has surrounded himself with a kind of shadow cabinet, according to the Russian sociologist Alexander Bibkov. The president has gathered into this inner circle people with whom he shares specific business interests, the sociologist explains. Their companies have been awarded large state contracts, which have made them huge amounts of money: "Putin always holds the reins, and is personally involved in the business," says Bibkov.

At the same time, society is being sold an image of Russia in which the country has only ever played a positive role, throughout its entire history. All negative aspects are erased, all past conflicts obliterated, Bibkov says. He describes this as the "manipulation of the collective historical memory." And this, too, reinforces Putin's power.

This narrative portrays Russia as a society with traditional values; one that disapproves of conflict with the authorities, whereas unconditional loyalty to those in power is both applauded and taken for granted.

All three experts interviewed by DW agree that these tendencies will intensify in the future, and that Putin will remain in power for a long time to come. "The problem is that there's no alternative candidate, and no room for one," says Mikhail Komin. "The last election Putin really won was in 2004. Everything since then has been unfair."

Grigory Nishnikov also comments that Russians see no alternative to Putin, and that they tend to be afraid of change. He observes that there has always been a tendency in Russia to favor a "strong hand" in government.

"They've always wanted a strong leader to make decisions and solve problems. If in doubt, Russians will complain about regional governors, not the president, along the lines of: If Putin only knew, he would solve the problem immediately!" This, Nishnikov says, is age-old Russian tradition.

This article has been translated from German.