Despite Chinese protest, Hawaii remained on the itinerary for Tsai Ing-wen”s tour of the Pacific. Experts say the leader’s trip is part of Taiwan’s "defensive" strategy, and aims to counter growing pressure from Beijing.
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During a visit to the US Pacific island state of Hawaii on Wednesday, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen confirmed her country had made a request to buy new US military equipment. The leader claimed the M-1 Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets would be for "self defense" and "deterrence."
The announcement was sharply criticized in Beijing, where China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang urged the US stop arms sales to Taiwan, or risk "serious damage" to US-China relations.
It’s not the first time this has happened. Last year, Taiwan bought some $330 million in military aircraft parts from the US. Although Washington and Taipei severed diplomatic ties 40 years ago, the two remain allies.
Tsai made the comments during a stopover in Hawaii, which concluded a week-long visit to three of Taiwan’s 17 remaining allies - Palau, Nauru and the Marshall Islands.
Her tour came amid increased tensions in the cross-strait relationship. After coming into power in 2016, Tsai’s party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) refused to state explicitly that Taiwan was part of China - one of the Chinese government’s demands.
While China has never ruled out taking Taiwan by force, the comments, coupled with the heightened military presence in the strait, have sent Taipei in search of more support.
Taiwan FM: 'We haven't accepted the 1992 consensus'
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Power in the Pacific
Bonnie Glaser, Director of the China Power Project at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told DW that Taiwan was facing heightened “military intimidation”. But, despite the “fighters and bombers circumnavigating Taiwan,” the country was still trying to carve out a sphere of influence in the region.
"I think the top priority this tour was to shore up Taiwan's relations with its allies in the south Pacific," Glaser said.
Since 2016, five countries have pulled support from Taiwan in favor of Beijing's "One China" policy, which claims the island is part of its territory. Glaser explained that Taipei was worried another Pacific ally, the Solomon Islands, could drop diplomatic support following elections next week.
"The Chinese have been poaching many of Taiwan's allies," the analyst told DW. "I think there are several that are vulnerable to switching sides."
"There is particular concern… that if the Solomons flip, some of these other countries in the Pacific might be vulnerable," she said. "Tsai Ing Wen is really trying to hold the line."
The Taiwanese leader didn't pay a visit to the Solomon Islands during her tour, but sent her deputy Foreign Minister there earlier this month.
"Stopover" diplomacy
Tsai's presence in Honolulu has symbolic significance because Taiwanese leaders are not able to meet higher-level US politicians due to the unofficial nature of their visits. But there are sometimes "private dimensions" to these stopovers, Glaser said.
"I think there's an opportunity for her to have a phone call with high-level officials, and they're usually not made public," she told DW. She added that it could also be possible for Tsai to have clandestine meetings with officials at the US Indo-Pacific command.
Taiwanese leaders have been granted more freedom from Washington while on US stopovers in recent years, according to Richard Bush, a senior fellow at Brooking Institute's East Asia center,
"It's an expression of friendship, but I think there's also belief that if you do it gradually, it's less provocative," he said.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has accused Washington of undermining the "One China" policy by allowing Tsai to visit. A spokesman last week said Beijing firmly opposed the arrangement of such "stopovers."
Chinese President Xi recently called for a "peaceful reunification" with Taiwan, prompting criticism from Taipei. What is the "Taiwan issue" all about? DW explores the history of the conflict through these photographs.
Image: AFP/AFP/Getty Images
Recapturing vs. liberation
After the end of WWII, the Communist Party of China (CPC) under Mao Zedong pursued a fierce battle against his archrival Chiang Kai-shek, chief of the Kuomintang (KMT) party. Chiang lost and took refuge in the island of Taiwan. For some time after that, Taiwan was the center of propaganda from both sides. The CPC wanted to "liberate" Taiwan, while Kuomintang wanted to "recapture the mainland."
Image: AFP/Getty Images
Letters to 'compatriots'
In the 1950s, the CPC published four "Messages to Chinese compatriots" in Taiwan, which are considered the basis of Beijing's Taiwan policy. In these texts, Beijing warned Taiwan of collaborating with US "imperialists." Military confrontation, particularly artillery attacks, also continued during this time.
Image: Imago/Zuma/Keystone
Beijing replaces Taipei in UN bodies
In 1971, the United Nations General Assembly declared that the People's Republic of China was the sole lawful representative of the country. With this decision, the Republic of China (ROC)/Taiwan was removed from all UN bodies. The frustration of ROC's foreign minister, Chow Shu-kai (right), and his ambassador Liu Chieh is easy to see in this picture.
Image: Imago/ZUMA/Keystone
New Taiwan policy
The fifth and last "message" from Beijing to Taiwan was published on January 1, 1979. The mainland, under the leadership of the reformist Deng Xiaoping ended military operations, announced the development of bilateral ties and promised peaceful reunification. However, Beijing's right to represent China internationally was not to be questioned.
Image: picture-alliance/dpa/UPI
'One China' policy
The new orientation of China's Taiwan policy took place as Washington and Beijing got closer. On January 1, 1979, the US and China resumed diplomatic relations, with Washington under President Jimmy Carter recognizing Beijing as the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. The US embassy in Taiwan was remodeled into an institute for culture.
Image: AFP/AFP/Getty Images
'One China, two systems'
Even before meeting US President Carter, Deng Xiaoping had introduced the principle of "one country, two systems," which allowed Taiwan to maintain its social systems even after reunification. However, Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-Kuo did not immediately fall for it. On the contrary, in 1987 he formulated the principle of "one China for the better system."
Image: picture-alliance/Everett Collection
The independence movement
In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's first opposition party, was founded. At a meeting in 1991, the DPP declared a clause for Taiwan's independence, which stipulated that Taiwan was sovereign and not a part of China.
Image: Getty Images/AFP/S. Yeh
'Consensus of 1992'
In unofficial Hong Kong talks in 1992, representatives of Taipei and Beijing reached a political agreement on the nature of their relationship. Both parties agreed that there was only one China. However, they had different views on what "One China" meant. A year later, the chief negotiators Wang (left) and Koo met in Singapore.
Image: Imago/Xinhua
Bilateral relations
In an interview with DW in 1995, the first democratically elected President of Taiwan and the KMT leader Lee Teng-hui said that all relations beyond the straits of Taiwan would be "defined as relations between states; at the very least, as a relationship of a special kind between states." His formulation was very close to being a declaration of independence.
Image: Academia Historica Taiwan
'A state on every side'
The DPP won the presidential election for the first time in 2000 with Chen Shui-bian, a Taiwanese-born politician who had no connections to mainland China, calling for "a state on each side." It meant that Taiwan should have nothing to do with China anymore. In 2005, Beijing reacted with the Anti-Secession Law, which allowed the use of military force in the event that Taiwan declared independence.
Image: picture alliance/AP Photo/Jerome Favre
'One China, different interpretations'
After losing the elections in 2000, the KMT adopted a changed formulation of the "Consensus of 1992" in the party's statute, which called for "one China, different interpretations." That is why the 1992 Consensus is still debated in Taiwan. The reason: the negotiators of 1992 did not have an official position.
Image: Imago/ZumaPress
CPC meets KMT
The mainland adopted the "Consensus of 1992" as a political basis for creating a relationship with Taiwan. In the first summit between the two sides since the communists came to power in China, Hu Jintao (right) and Lian Zhan endorsed the "Consensus of 1992" and the "One China" principle.
Image: picture-alliance/dpa/M. Reynolds
'The direction is correct'
After KMT's Ma Ying-Jeou won the 2008 presidential elections, both sides continued to come closer. In an interview with DW in 2009, Ma said: "The straits of Taiwan should be a place of peace and security. We have come a lot closer to this goal. Basically our direction is correct."
Image: GIO
Quo vadis?
After the elections in 2016, when President Tsai Ing-wen came to power, the independence movement gained a lot of wind. Tsai disputed the existence of the 1992 consensus and described the "attempt of China to interfere in the political and social development of Taiwan" as the "biggest challenge."
Image: ROC
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US balancing act
"The State Department wants to improve the conduct of relations [with Taiwan] but to do so within the parameters of past policy and also maintain a certain balance with its relationship with China," Bush told DW.
This requires a diplomatic balancing act in Washington, as China continues to put military and social pressure on Taiwan.
"The growing threat that China is posing towards Taiwan is not just a military threat. It is interference in Taiwan's politics and society. It is economic carrots and sticks, sowing divisions within Taiwan, including cyber intrusions and manipulation of social media," said Glaser.
The analyst also said that US President Donald Trump would not use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in dealing with China.
"Very early in his tenure, he did say that he might not reaffirm the One China policy. But he learned very quickly the risk of not doing that," said Glaser.